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Nick Salvatore 
THE DECLINE OF LABOR 
A Grim Picture, A Few Proposals 
P 
I B AT 
ATCO. Hormel, Greyhound. Eastern, 
Nordstrom. Equitable: the list goes on and on. 
Organized labor has suffered its worst decade 
since the 1920s, as intense employer opposi-
tion, encouraged and supported by conservative 
national administrations, left the labor move-
ment reeling, its membership falling, its morale 
plummeting. Even victories, such as occurred 
in the Pittston coal strike, left an odd taste. The 
United Mine Workers and their allies won a 
major victory to maintain the status quo; but 
the hope that this success would rejuvenate 
labor's spirit has proved elusive. 
There are some who argue that, painful as 
the Reagan-Bush era has been, it did not usher 
in a new domestic order. In a popular 
adaptation of cyclical theories of reform 
articulated by Irving Bernstein. Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr., and Kevin Phillips, many in labor 
have come to see this decade of pain as a 
harbinger of regeneration. As the CIO (Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations) emerged 
victorious from the Coolidge-Hoover decade of 
anti-unionism, so too would labor lay the 
foundation of renewed growth and vitality. 
Perhaps, but I fear not. It is foolhardy to 
predict the future, as the pundits who predicted 
labor's continued decline in the spring of 1933 
discovered. There exists an enormous capacity 
for human initiative even in the worst of times. 
A historically informed analysis of the situation 
confronting labor, however, undermines easy 
confidence that the 1990s will duplicate the 
experiences of the 1930s. 
Many of the hopes for regeneration draw 
strength from blaming Reagan. Bush. and. to 
some extent, union leaders for labor's precipi-
tous decline. The current level of union 
strength, at some 16 percent of the work force, 
is often considered the consequence of Repub-
lican policies, employer resistance, and the 
somewhat inept response of labor's leadership. 
The failure to follow the 1981 Labor Day 
demonstration in Washington with continued 
activity in cities throughout the country is noted 
as one example of how the leadership failed. 
The ugly open fight within labor's family that 
enveloped all sides in the Hormel strike is 
another example. There is an assumption that if 
leaders would only listen to their rank and file, 
grounding themselves again in the militancy of 
the American working class, a revitalized labor 
movement would, in time, vanquish employers 
and Republicans alike. This, in turn, supports 
the belief that, following the darkened 1980s, 
the 1990s will emerge in a ClO-like flourish. 
For if labor's decline is of recent vintage, as 
many believe, the turnaround, however compli-
cated. is also close at hand. The history of the 
past forty years, alas, suggests the opposite. 
In its 1960 report the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) noted that the figure for union 
density (the percentage of workers organized in 
the nonagricultural work force) had dropped 2 
percent from its historic 1953 high of 34.1 
percent. Although during the 1950s the re-
united labor movement was widely recognized 
as an important force in the nation's political 
and economic life, the BLS did not see this 
trend as an aberration. Instead, it noted that "in 
recent years'' these figures had consistently 
"moved slowly downward." A decade later. 
following a oeriod of unparalleled economic 
expansion, the BLS reported an even lower 
figure, with only 27.4 percent of the work 
force organized. 
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The expansion of unionization among gov-
ernment employees, following John F. 
Kennedy's 1962 executive order allowing them 
to join unions, temporarily masked a disturbing 
BLS finding: between 1968 and 1970, union 
membership in manufacturing had declined by 
more than 45,000. This was a small figure, to 
be sure, when the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) and the United Steelworkers (USW) 
had a combined membership of over 2.6 
million, but ominous, nonetheless, in a decade 
of economic growth. By 1980, when Courtney 
D. Gifford edited the BLS volume, the 
percentage of union workers had dropped to 
24.7. The decline of unionization in industrial 
production continued during the 1970s. In the 
last two years of that decade, Courtney 
estimated, the UAW and the Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers (ACTWU) each 
lost over 9 percent of their members, the steel 
workers' union lost 3.7 percent, and the United 
Rubber Workers 15.2 percent. Even when the 
economy recovered from the recession in 
1979-1982, these unions failed to revive. 
The social context of this four-decade 
decline challenges a central assumption of the 
cyclical theory. More than a third of the decline 
occurred during the 1950s and 1960s, decades 
of broad economic growth and, for the 1960s, 
of liberal Democratic ascendancy. Labor lost 
another 15 percent during the stagflation of the 
1970s, despite the Democratic return to power 
in the wake of a discredited Republican 
administration. By the 1980s, when a structur-
ally weakened labor movement faced Ronald 
Reagan, plant closings and demands for 
concessions accelerated the decline. Organized 
labor's absolute and proportional decline over 
i decades in which the labor force itself grew 
; dramatically suggests that the hoped-for resur-
I gence does not lie in awaiting a liberal-populist 
|reprise of the 1930s or "waiting for Lefty." 
|Reagan created obstacles, but he possessed no 
supernatural powers. Rather, as Daniel Bell 
argued in 1959 in his prescient book The End of 
Ideology, when labor had then organized about 
30 percent of the work force: "But in 
organizing this 30 percent, they have reached a 
saturation mark: they have organized as much 
of their potential as they can." 
Bell pointed to the difficulties of organizing 
small remaining unorganized workplaces in the 
industrial and service sectors and thought that 
economic realities would limit labor's expendi-
ture of vast sums of money for small potential 
returns. He also argued that the potential 
increase in membership in distribution and 
transportation would benefit such unions as the 
Teamsters; but that growth would be offset "by 
the shrinkage in the industrial work force" 
overall. Bell also argued that labor's failure, 
evident even in 1959, to organize the white-
collar sector would continue; profound gaps 
between white- and blue-collar workers would 
make it almost impossible to achieve an 
alliance. To all this he added the limits 
imposed on collective bargaining by the 
necessity of tying wages to productivity 
(which, as John Hoerr makes clear for steel, 
was not always achieved) and the changes 
occurring in the working class as it increasingly 
went from a proletariat that worked for hourly 
wages to a "salariat, with a consequent change 
in the psychology of the workers." If Bell is 
right—and I think his analysis holds up 
remarkably well —then a structural transforma-
tion occurred over these last decades that 
undermines the hope that time is on "our" side. 
•What then is the nature of this structural 
change and how does it affect the possibility of 
a resurgence? Perhaps the most important 
difference between the 1930s and the 1990s is 
that in the 1930s the economy sat on the edge 
of an enormous industrial expansion that 
produced goods, services, and new jobs in 
unprecedented numbers over the following 
decades. During the 1960s, however, that 
situation began to change. The manufacturing 
sector lost ground to the white-collar and 
service sectors, with a consequent loss of jobs 
in the most unionized sector of the economy. 
Simultaneously, in steel, auto, rubber, tex-
tile, and other industrial sectors, American 
producers lost technological leadership and 
market share to foreign imports, primarily from 
Japan and Germany, but with Hong Kong, 
Korea, and Taiwan highly competitive as well. 
The key to this change lay in what the Japanese 
were able to achieve: high quality goods, with 
low production costs, and the ability, with 
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highly flexible structures and work rules, to 
adapt quickly to changed demand. Given this 
evolution in production, blue jeans or steel 
beams produced abroad could be more than 
competitive on the American market. In an 
increasingly international market, American 
industrial producers often found themselves at 
a competitive disadvantage: either they contin-
ued to lose ground to the imports, attempted to 
transform their production methods in the 
Japanese image, or sought relief in protection-
ist trade policies. In any case, the loss of union 
jobs remained a constant. 
Labor's response to this change proved 
inadequate, as indeed did management's as 
well. For too long each side squared off across 
the rhetorical divide of class conflict, with a 
weakened labor movement, not surprisingly, 
faring poorly. When labor did join with 
industry, moreover, the uneasy alliance most 
often assumed a defensive, nationalist posture, 
demanding a protective tariff high enough to 
prevent "dumping" of high quality, low-cost 
products. Bound by its own historic suspicions 
of state involvement in the economy, labor 
made few sustained efforts to develop a 
coherent industrial policy in either the corridors 
of power or in the public arena. In any case, 
these alliances quickly broke down. Competing 
business interests (and not just the Reagan 
administration) made protectionism a highly 
controversial public policy. Those firms able to 
compete in the revamped international market 
demanded free trade so as not to be excluded 
from lucrative foreign markets. In auto, for 
example, any tendency toward "Japan-bash-
ing" quickly gave way to cooperative efforts 
between Japanese and American manufactur-
ers. That American corporations used this 
transformation to further weaken unions in 
their industries and to undercut hard-won gains 
in wages and work conditions is true; but it is 
not the only truth. In order to stay competitive 
within capitalism's global framework, funda-
mental changes were required, lest more jobs 
be lost. In the absence of a public consensus 
that would provide, under government aegis, 
joint labor-management oversight of basic 
industrial policy—an absence with roots in 
American political culture far deeper than 
Ronald Reagan—"free market" concepts dom-
inated the (de)regulation of this transformation. 
The central problem that the union move-
ment faces is not that the employers did not 
play fair. Critics who yell foul at manage-
ment's hard-ball policy forget the intense 
antagonism that has usually marked American 
industrial relations. We have to face it: labor's 
central problem has to do with the fact that, 
whichever way it turns, it faces bleak alterna-
tives. To continue in an adversarial mode and 
engage management in direct conflict promises 
little success. Production can be shifted, 
strikebreakers introduced, new technologies 
substituted. But it is not at all clear that 
accommodation with management will bring 
better results. In auto, for example, a decade-
long experiment with labor-management coop-
eration has been quite successful in preserving 
some jobs, increasing quality, and streamlining 
production. Yet the domestic auto industry and 
the UAW remain highly vulnerable to compe-
tition, especially from Japan. As of summer 
1991, American auto producers continued to 
lose market share to Japanese models; while the 
UAW remained unable to organize the Japa-
nese "transplants" that increasingly dot the 
American landscape. These twin losses, cou-
pled with a sluggish economy, produced the 
inevitable: in an industry with serious efforts at 
cooperation, General Motors announced last 
summer that it would close two more plants by 
1993, at a cost of an additional 3,500 jobs. 
Since 1988 eight GM production plants have 
closed, directly as a result of Japanese 
competition. While the UAW leaders claimed 
that GM was "dishonest, callous and just plain 
dumb," and called for restrictions on imports, 
the underlying reality was worse. At the 
nonunion transplants, wholly owned subsidiar-
ies of Japanese corporations, production in-
creased, quality was high, and a relatively 
satisfied work force has, to date, rejected union 
organization. 
Under both Democratic and Republican 
administrations labor has lost ground. Unable 
to stem the loss of membership or to achieve 
labor law reform under any administration from 
Harry Truman to George Bush, labor has 
endured—barely. Organizing drives in Los 
Angeles during the 1960s and in Houston in the 
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1980s simply petered out. By 1988, according 
to Courtney Gifford, less than 10 percent of the 
working class under age twenty-five held union 
cards; of those between twenty-six and thirty-
four, a paltry 15 percent. Even more difficult 
were the alterations in basic industry. The 
UAW lost over three hundred thousand mem-
bers between 1980 and 1988. Still more 
disturbing is that the losses since 1988 have cut 
into the core of the union's membership, affect-
ing production workers with significant levels 
of seniority. Indeed, the UAW seemed to have 
recognized these realities in the last contract 
round when it bargained for income, rather than 
job security, in the form of extensive financial 
benefits for displaced workers. 
In steel and rubber, the conditions are 
actually worse because neither union has been 
able to achieve the security the UAW obtained 
for its members. While public sector unions 
continued to grow during the 1980s at a good 
rate (Service Employees International Union 
increased by 17 percent between 1980 and 
1987), unions in the private sector hemor-
rhaged. In that same period the Steel workers 
lost 58 percent (over seven hundred thousand) 
of their members, the Machinists lost 32 
percent, the Carpenters 22 percent, and the 
Electrical Workers 23 percent. 
The transformation of work and the demands 
of international competition have produced 
structural changes in the economy. Computer 
technology now allows banks and major 
corporations to have work forces in Ireland, 
Barbados, and Singapore process the personal 
checks of New Yorkers and the medical claims 
of union members covered by commercial 
insurers and to maintain the circulation files of 
major publishers. 
Labor's valued post-1945 "social contract" 
with employers now seems a product less of a 
permanent social change than of a particular 
historical moment. Hammered out during a 
time of American economic dominance, this 
"contract" has clearly become a casualty of the 
economic restructuring. It is to preserve and 
restore central aspects of that "social contract" 
(livable wages, affordable medical insurance, 
pension and vacation benefits, and so on) that 
leads many to turn to the political arena. They 
hope to achieve there what has been lost in the 
economic struggle. Here too, however, labor's 
position is far more tenuous than it once was. 
For forty-four years the labor movement has 
been unable to repeal the most offensive 
aspects of the Taft-Hartley Act, passed over 
Truman's veto in 1947. Through both Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations, in the 
heyday of liberalism as in the depths of 
Reagan's reverie, labor has been unable to 
amend what its leaders have called a "slave 
labor bill." This failure was long understood as 
the consequence of an unholy, regressive 
alliance between southern Democrats and 
northern Republicans. Labor's voters, gener-
ally held to be liberal and progressive (even if 
historically some 30 percent voted Republi-
can), formed the backbone of the Democratic 
party. But by the Reagan years that distinction 
no longer held true. In the 1984 national 
election, which saw the reelection of Ronald 
Reagan in the wake of the PATCO strike and 
other overt anti-union policies, slightly more 
than 40 percent of trade unionists voted for the 
Reagan-Bush ticket. How, after four years of 
Reagan, could some 40 percent of organized 
workers and their families vote for one of the 
most openly anti-union presidents in recent 
memory? What does such a vote indicate about 
labor's internal composition? Answers to such 
questions do not encourage optimism. 
M hose who would look to the 1930s, 
explicitly or not, as a model for reform-
in-the-making, would do well to consider some 
important components of that decade. Liberal-
ism as a political movement was ascendant, 
spurred by the horrendous unemployment and 
the inactivity of the Hoover administration. 
Liberalism had a clearly identifiable premise: 
government had an important role to play in 
social and economic life. Tactically, New Deal 
liberalism, while containing within it many 
tensions and contradictions, possessed a central 
vision. As Thomas and Mary Edsall have 
written: "The original strength of Democratic 
liberalism was its capacity to build majorities 
out of minorities." It was within this frame-
work that the CIO flourished. Itself a coalition 
of tendencies, the CIO, in tandem with the 
Democratic party, provided the organizational 
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focus for these newly mobilized workers who 
were shedding many of the ethnic differences 
that had, in the 1920s, hampered unionization. 
But today liberalism as a political movement 
is adrift, discredited in the popular culture and 
lacking within itself a defining premise. Gone 
is the operating premise about the role of 
government in American life; absent is wide-
spread support for a variety of social programs; 
diminished, too, is the belief that organized 
working people represent a progressive force in 
the society. Democratic congressional repre-
sentative Jim Slattery of Kansas, who authored 
legislation in April 1991 that ended the rail 
strike over the opposition of the unions, 
expressed some of these new attitudes in 
explaining his bill: 
I consider myself to be a representative of the 
blue-collar workers of America. But there are two 
basic factors to keep in mind. One is that the 
number of workers who are members of labor 
unions has dramatically declined. In many 
congressional districts there are more small 
businessmen and women than there are members 
of labor unions. Second, in the last ten years, with 
the emergence of political action committees, the 
Democratic party is less dependent on the 
contributions of organized labor than it was fifteen 
years ago. 
The fact that liberalism has always been a 
practical political philosophy underscores the 
very crisis labor confronts today. Political 
rhetoric is no substitute for the necessary ward 
and precinct captains committed to a specific 
social program. There are many Jim Slatterys 
who now respond in ways dramatically differ-
ent from what their predecessors did in the 
1930s or 1940s. They do not fear retribution 
from labor or from Democratic party leaders 
for violating party discipline. The former has 
little ability to punish while the latter has no 
defined position on labor policy that would 
provide a reason for such discipline. 
As labor has never been a majority force in 
American society, the inability of liberalism to 
maintain coalition politics is of profound 
importance. Over the last half century liberal 
legislators and trade unionists joined to support 
a governmental social program. But as commu-
nities across the nation have lost important 
portions of their tax base because of economic 
restructuring, the pressure on city and state 
governments to raise taxes has intensified, 
especially in light of federal cuts in social 
services. This has greatly strained labor's 
traditional coalition politics. Both trade union-
ists and unorganized working people, espe-
cially in the private sector, have been quite 
vocal in their communities (New Jersey, for 
example) in resisting new taxes or transfers of 
what they perceive as their diminishing re-
sources to poorer residents. Simultaneously, 
some public-sector workers in New Jersey were 
so infuriated with Democratic cuts in social 
spending that they threatened to run indepen-
dent, union slates in the legislative elections. 
"This is the end of the relationship between the 
Democrats and the labor movement," Robert 
Purcell, regional director for the Communica-
tions Workers of America, announced. But lest 
one think that this signaled the long-awaited 
return of "Lefty," a reporter asked Purcell 
whether labor had many friends among the 
Republicans. "I'm not sure we ever had a lot of 
friends among the Republicans," was the reply. 
"But if we are going to get hurt, we'll take a lot 
of people down with us." Purcell's comments 
reflect more than personal pique. In such an 
atmosphere, coalition building frequently fal-
ters or is never attempted. 
Oentral to this divisiveness within labor, as in 
the larger society, has been the issue of race. It 
is not irrelevant that black unionists make up an 
ever larger percentage of public-sector workers 
or that the recipients of such government 
programs are widely, if erroneously, perceived 
as the black or Hispanic poor. The effect on 
labor's electoral efforts is troublesome. In the 
1984 national election, labor's problem was not 
just that 40 percent of its members and their 
families voted Republican. When broken down 
by race these figures reveal that more than half 
of all white union family members pulled the 
lever for Reagan-Bush in 1984. The Democrats 
did as well as they did within labor largely as a 
result of the
 vblack vote. These statistics, 
essentially replicated four years later, suggest 
that the problems of building coalitions even 
within labor's diverse membership will be 
incredibly difficult. 
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Since 1964 white men in general, northern 
and southern, workers and employers, have left 
the Democratic fold in large numbers. Al-
though nationally the Democratic party still 
maintains a lead by a small margin, the 
Republicans have edged ahead for the first time 
in two generations among white voters and 
among all voters under forty. In contrast, less 
than 10 percent of blacks list themselves as 
Republicans. Affirmative action, welfare, the 
problems of the underclass, urban crime—these 
and other issues have effectively, if viciously, 
been used by Republican candidates to make 
serious inroads into traditional liberal constitu-
encies, and specifically within labor's ranks. It 
is not as if all these whites are racists, although 
racism does explain a good portion of this 
reaction. Rather, as Jim Sleeper has argued in 
The Closest of Strangers, white workers 
themselves are hard-pressed economically, 
threatened by crime and neighborhood decay, 
and have received little understanding from 
liberals. Long before liberalism imploded upon 
itself, many of these workers already thought it 
was a bankrupt political force. As for organized 
labor, it has had neither the energy nor the 
vision to address these issues within its ranks. 
Thus, at a time when the need is greatest, the 
ability to build liberal coalitions is weakest. Eth-
nic and racial divisions abound and. in some quar-
ters. even to hint at the potential for uncovering 
common ground is cause for scorn and rejection. 
A depressing moment, to be sure. Is there any-
thing. then, that might be done? 
One foundation for the reversal of this 
situation may rest, paradoxically, in the 
recognition that no quick or immediate solution 
exists. Offering credit cards, for example, in an 
effort to gain the confidence of nonunion 
workers is at best a timid response that diverts 
attention from the depth of the problem; at its 
worst, it confuses the role of the union with 
that of the consumer culture. The nature of 
production may be changing, but unions must 
tocus their energy on workers' relationship to 
production nonetheless. 
It might be useful for labor to take this 
moment of structural change and organizational 
weakness to reassess its vision of a possible 
American future. The experience of the munic-
ipal unions in 1991 in New York City's 
ongoing fiscal crisis may be instructive here. 
The public emphasis on the old, hoary slogan, 
"Tax the rich," actually worked to undermine 
the possibility of using that very crisis to 
(re-)build a broader coalition of working 
people. While the slogan contained a certain 
elementary truth (tax laws are not equitable), it 
appeared to deny the economic restructuring 
that has transformed the tax base in cities and 
states. Its claim of justice for one segment of 
the work force, moreover, rang hollow for the 
overwhelming majority of workers who fell 
outside such union contracts. Higher raises for 
teachers may seem easy to justify; but if they 
come at the expense of classroom size and the 
quality of instruction for the overwhelmingly 
nonunion working-class children of New 
York's public school system, these increases 
pose a long-term problem for the teachers' 
union, for the labor movement, and, not least, 
for the children themselves. 
Unions traditionally fight for their members, 
but in this context the flourish of combat was 
counterproductive. Given that raises and im-
proved conditions for pupils in the schools 
could not both be achieved in the same fiscal 
year, the teachers' demands appeared to many, 
working people as well as middle class, as 
narrow, selfish demands from relatively well-
paid city workers. These raises in turn 
established the plateau sought by other city 
workers, with the painful result that whatever 
shreds of broader political vision labor could 
claim lay tattered in the streets. 
But there is another option, one that would 
both recognize the seriousness of the crisis and 
begin the revival of labor's self-esteem. Had 
the unions used that moment to raise in public 
discussion and at union meetings the interde-
pendency of all working people, a different 
political vision might have emerged. If, for 
example, teachers and hospital workers, social 
workers and janitors, jointly discussed both 
their needs and the effects of such demands on 
others, including the recipients of their services 
and working- and middle-class taxpayers, two 
possible results, might have emerged. Labor 
could have taken a giant step toward being 
perceived, for the first time in a generation, as 
a positive force in the lives of unorganized 
working people; and out of those ideas an 
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alternative public policy position might have 
emerged. However understandable may be the 
urge to protect one's members, labor in New 
York nonetheless lost the opportunity to claim 
a more important goal in speaking for a 
common good and a common vision. "Share 
the pain" might have been the slogan; a sharp, 
informed analysis of the inequities in determin-
ing winners and losers in this quite real fiscal 
crisis across all segments of the city's people 
might have been the trenchant, underlying 
message. Even if it lost in the immediate 
moment, the fact that organized labor tran-
scended its tendency to equate the needs of its 
ever-diminishing membership with those of all 
working people would have provided a founda-
tion for further education and activity. 
A o call for a broad public debate within the 
house of labor, a debate premised on the 
recognition of that interdependency, is not to 
suggest that labor cede its efforts at organizing. 
Rather, it is to argue that those efforts will not, 
on balance, be successful without an effort to 
reposition labor at the core of working people's 
lives. A recent study by Hank Farber of 
Princeton University suggests why. Farber 
found that, among nonunion workers, job 
satisfaction increased and/or these workers 
remained unconvinced that unions could offer 
solutions to what dissatisfactions they had. To 
attempt to regain that position of importance 
labor needs to encourage the development of an 
inclusive social vision within its own ranks that 
may then serve as a basis for appealing to 
nonunion workers. Such a vision would, to be 
effective, publicly recognize the scope of the 
economic transformation already accomplished. 
This is essential for labor's own self-education, 
for the last thing labor needs at present is 
(understandable) anger and misinformation. 
Such an effort would have the additional 
benefit of directly involving a larger portion of 
labor's own members in developing specific 
policy responses. National leaders and staff 
experts play an important role, but without a 
broader involvement the contradictory attitudes 
within labor will find few avenues for resolu-
tion. The tensions that exist between public-
and private-sector workers need discussion, as 
do the effects of the public sector's political 
decisions on the private sector's economy. 
These issues of industrial policy are simply too 
critical for labor not to develop regional and 
national voices projecting an informed social 
analysis. Such efforts will not secure labor 
from further immediate erosion but they may 
provide ideas necessary for a rebuilding in the 
future. Finally, this public recognition of that 
interdependency may provide a way to address 
more frankly the divisive issue of race within 
labor's ranks. 
To achieve such a vision it is not necessary 
to transform the labor movement into some-
thing it traditionally has not been. It is a 
profound irony of present circumstances that a 
labor movement that has been for so long 
pragmatic and narrow in enunciating its 
interests must now expand its vision if only to 
protect that narrower set of interests. Nor is it 
necessary for labor to transform itself organiza-
tionally to initiate this debate. Although 
national leaders can and should encourage such 
discussion, it is at the local level where the 
critical change must occur. In existing shop-
steward councils, in the infrequently used 
one-to-one programs between stewards and the 
rank and file, and in labor and labor-
community coalitions already in place the 
structures exist to generate a discussion of 
possible responses. That labor by itself cannot 
dictate public policy should not paralyze these 
efforts; nor should the seeming invincibility of 
that Republican ascendancy bring only gloom. 
If only by default, labor may be one of the few 
national institutions able to serve as the 
incubator of a new liberal coalition. At a 
minimum such an attempt will provide labor 
with an understanding of the present depressed 
circumstances that will guard against greater 
demoralization. As Vaclav Havel wrote: "No 
political defeat justifies complete historical 
skepticism as long as the victims manage to 
bear their defeats with dignity." Poised as we 
are at a moment when the strength of the 
contemporary labor movement is fast approach-
ing its pre-1918 level, the specter of wide-
spread skepticism is the most frightening 
possibility. • 
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